In a chapter titled Amateurs Go To War, Battle Cry of Freedom author James M. McPherson describes the South’s strategy:
“Jefferson Davis […] early in the war he seems to have envisaged a strategy like that of George Washington in the Revolution. Washington traded space for time; he retreated when necessary in the face of a stronger enemy; he counterattacked against isolated British outposts or detachments when such an attack promised success; above all, he tried to avoid full-scale battles that would have risked annihilation of his army and defeat of his cause. This has been called a strategy of attrition — a strategy of winning by not losing, of wearing out a better equipped foe and compelling him to give up by prolonging the war and making it too costly.”
I shared this with my friend (and historian) Bob Priddy, suggesting parallels to the Taliban strategy in Afghanistan. Bob’s reply:
You have come to a realization that the American military has not come to grips with since time began. We still fight our wars as if it was Breed’s Hill (not Bunker Hill), with one side barricaded and visible and the other side marching resolutely forward, sacrificing enough bodies that eventually the marching force will overcome the barricaded force by surviving numbers or will fall back, weakened and puzzled at the lack of success. It’ why we “lost” Vietnam. It’s why our two-decade effort at nation building in Afghanistan ultimately failed. The parallels of Vietnam and Afghanistan are marked.
We can’t make good Republicans (no snide comments about that phrase) and good Democrats out of people who see no such things, never have, and have never wanted them.
Jefferson Davis ultimately failed because he never had the cunning or the tools the Taliban has — although the white supremacist philosophy never lost. The Confederacy did. But white supremacy lurks in the philosophical underground tunnels of our time. We can be grateful that its ride into Washington in January was not as successful as the Taliban’s ride into Kabul.
Poor planning and inept leadership saved us this time.
To say that I “couldn’t put this book down,” is a time-worn cliche. And let’s face it, I can put just about any non-fiction book down. But I read this book in 24 hours which is really fast for me. I picked this book because I like the way Michael Wolff writes. I’ll let others judge his reporting, but the man knows how to tell a story. In Landslide, he comes as close as anyone could to making sense of the chaos and madness of Donald Trump’s final days. This book reads like a thriller (or a horror story).